

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTORS
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for
Psychological Operations

1. Attached for discussion at the Assistant Directors' Meeting on Monday, 18 June 1951, is a draft memorandum which it is proposed to distribute to the key people in the field of psychological intelligence and operations in State, CIA and Defense. The paper was written after discussions with all interested organizations, and the analysis section has had the benefit of considerable interagency comment.

2. It is requested specifically that the five general principles listed in paragraph 2 of the draft memorandum be approved.

JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for
Psychological Operations

1. The attached paper is distributed for information and for such guidance as it may provide. Recognizing that further refinements may be possible it is hoped that this will clarify and stabilize existing arrangements, focus attention on any important disagreements, and isolate component problems requiring further adjustments. Recipients are not asked to indicate their formal concurrence but their comments and suggestions will be welcome and appropriate revisions will be issued. In the event that an agency disagrees with a basic point in the paper, it is requested to discuss the matter with this office and, if agreement cannot be reached, the issue should be framed for discussion and decision at a higher level.

2. The general principles of the paper, which have been approved in CIA, are briefly as follows:

a. Intelligence support for psychological operations is not a job to be undertaken by any single agency but should be a cooperative effort of State, CIA and the Military Services. (Pp. 1-5, section B, 1-12)

b. In making this cooperative effort each IAC agency should call on the others for intelligence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest. (p. 6, para. 2)

c. The coordination of a particular paper in the psychological field, just as in other fields, should be done by the agency primarily responsible for producing that paper. (p. 7, para. 4)

d. CIA (O/IC) will assist in making arrangements and ironing out difficulties that may arise. (Pp. 7, 8, para. 6)

e. The Director of the new Psychological Strategy Board should look directly to the producing agencies for his intelligence support, but he may call on CIA (O/IC) for assistance as required. (p. 8, para. 7)

JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010018-9

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010018-9

C. COORDINATION

1. A large proportion of all the foreign intelligence collected or produced by the U.S. agencies is of value in planning or executing psychological operations. Most of this information was being produced for military or political purposes long before there was general recognition of the importance of psychological warfare and propaganda. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to attempt to coordinate the production of all this intelligence merely on the basis of one of the several purposes which it serves--psychological operations. At the same time it is clear that for propaganda and psychological purposes more intelligence is needed than would otherwise be the case. The difference, however, is chiefly quantitative and not one of kind. An inspection of the twelve types of intelligence listed

in section B above shows that there is no clear dividing-line between the psychological and the political--even though such a line might possibly be drawn between the psychological and the military. Because of the impossibility of dividing political and psychological and because much of this intelligence is already being produced and is being coordinated on an ad hoc basis, it becomes necessary to treat the additional intelligence necessary for psychological support in the same way as that which is already being produced for political and other purposes. If present coordination is inadequate, the problem is a general one to be addressed all along the line and not by special arrangements in the "psychological" field.

2. In order to produce the best intelligence with a reasonable expenditure of money and trained personnel and with a minimum of jurisdictional friction between the agencies, there is one important concept that must be understood and accepted. This is the principle of interdependence, which involves a recognition of departmental specializations, a realization that every agency in the psychological field has intelligence needs in each of the twelve categories listed, and a willingness to cooperate in an attempt to fulfill the needs of other agencies besides one's own. (See NSCID 3.) This interdependence requires:
 - a. That each IAC agency perform its work with high competence and thus develop a confidence on the part of the other agencies. Conversely this implies that each agency in good faith provide full information to the others and make known any dissatisfaction with their products. Complaints should be taken as high as necessary to achieve results.
 - b. That each agency make extraordinary efforts to give prompt attention to the requests of others and not to give precedence automatically to internal requests over those received from other agencies. These decisions on priorities can be made only by the responsible head of the producing unit, and he can make wise decisions only if fully informed by the several requesting offices.
 - c. That the intelligence people have or get the authority necessary from their own chiefs to enable them to deal directly and informally with their opposite numbers in the other agencies.
3. In order to produce the kind of intelligence support needed, a close relationship should be established between the psychological planners and operators and their intelligence counterparts. Although the Air Force's psychological division must look primarily to AFOIN for support, this should not be construed

to prevent direct contacts by the psychological division under AFOIN sponsorship, with State intelligence. It is important that all PW planners and operators understand the fields of the various intelligence units and to some extent are familiar with their current production plans. Only in this way can satisfactory support be provided.

4. Initiative in the field of psychological intelligence can and should come from several different places: any one of the IAC intelligence agencies, any of the operators or planners, Mr. Barrett's PCB and its secretariat, and the new PSB with its director and staff. The first thing to do with an idea or request in this field is to get it to an intelligence agency. The departmental operators and planners would naturally go to the intelligence agencies in their own departments. Ideas from PCB can reach Intelligence through any one of a number of channels, the most usual of which would be from Mr. Barrett and P to Mr. Armstrong and R. (The channels for PSB will be discussed below.) It then becomes the responsibility of whatever intelligence agency has been approached to get the information requested. The principal burden may fall on it or may be passed to another agency with more direct interest in the subject matter. In either case the person ultimately to do the job proceeds to get it done and coordinates with others as needed, calling and chairing ad hoc meetings if necessary. Thus, neither does State do all the coordinating nor is it relieved of doing any.
5. CIA has several distinct responsibilities in the field of psychological intelligence. O/PC's interest as a consumer need not be discussed. O/O contributes both raw and evaluated intelligence largely from its [redacted] [redacted] The other collection offices operate as for other types of intelligence and the same is true of the handling and dissemination of the raw and finished product. O/SI is responsible for the scientific and technical intelligence on communications and jamming. O/NE will coordinate the production of national estimates in the psychological field as they do in any other. The Office of Intelligence Coordination has a responsibility to see that appropriate intelligence support is provided for psychological operations and that the intelligence activities of the government in this field are properly coordinated.
6. CIA's coordinating responsibility, which falls on O/IC, does not involve a substantive review of the papers produced elsewhere; nor is it a channel for transmitting the requests or output of one agency to another. It does provide a neutral place to which problems and complaints can be brought if the usual direct approach has been found inadequate. This means that O/IC is concerned with difficulties and arrangements and should not be looked to for help in coordinating a substantive

25X1

25X1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

paper where the experts involved can accomplish it themselves. O/IC will take such initiative as it can to improve the coordination of intelligence support for psychological operations, but it will be forced to rely to a considerable degree on the other agencies to point out defects or, if possible, to effect improvements without reference to O/IC.

7. To whom does the director of the new Psychological Strategy Board look for his intelligence support? In pursuance of the analysis and principles developed in this paper, he should look directly to the producing agency. Although this paper has been focused on the information and propaganda aspects of psychological operations, the principles are equally applicable to the other fields of the Board's activity. If it is clear which intelligence agency is responsible for the desired information, this direct approach is simpler and more effective. If the PSB staff does not know where to get the information they seek, they should raise the matter with CIA (Office of Intelligence Coordination), which will either direct them to the proper agency or arrange for the responsibility to be clearly placed. If the quality of the reports received is inferior, the PSB staff, like any other requestor, should discuss the matter with the producing agency. If unable to achieve results this way, however, they should bring their problem to the attention of CIA (Office of Intelligence Coordination) and request assistance.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Psy. Strat. Board

14 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTORS
ASSISTANT DIRECTORS

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for
Psychological Operations

1. Attached for discussion at the Assistant Directors' Meeting on Monday, 18 June 1951, is a draft memorandum which it is proposed to distribute to the key people in the field of psychological intelligence and operations in State, CIA and Defense. The paper was written after discussions with all interested organizations, and the analysis section has had the benefit of considerable interagency comment.

2. It is requested specifically that the five general principles listed in paragraph 2 of the draft memorandum be approved.

JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T I-A-L

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for
Psychological Operations

1. The attached paper is distributed for information and for such guidance as it may provide. Recognizing that further refinements may be possible it is hoped that this will clarify and stabilize existing arrangements, focus attention on any important disagreements, and isolate component problems requiring further adjustments. Recipients are not asked to indicate their formal concurrence but their comments and suggestions will be welcome and appropriate revisions will be issued. In the event that an agency disagrees with a basic point in the paper, it is requested to discuss the matter with this office and, if agreement cannot be reached, the issue should be framed for discussion and decision at a higher level.

2. The general principles of the paper, which have been approved in CIA, are briefly as follows:

a. Intelligence support for psychological operations is not a job to be undertaken by any single agency but should be a cooperative effort of State, CIA and the Military Services. (Pp. 1-5, section B, 1-12)

b. In making this cooperative effort each IAC agency should call on the others for intelligence which does not fall within its own field of dominant interest. (p. 6, para. 2)

c. The coordination of a particular ^{paper} in the psychological field, just as in other fields, should be done by the agency primarily responsible for ~~producing that paper~~. (p. 7, para. 4)

d. CIA (O/IC) will assist in making arrangements and ironing out difficulties that may arise. (Pp. 7, 8, para. 6)

e. The Director of the new Psychological Strategy Board should look directly to the producing agencies for his intelligence support, but he may call on CIA (O/IC) for assistance as required. (p. 8, para. 7)

*Initials
what
project*


JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010018-9

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010018-9



C. COORDINATION

1. A large proportion of all the foreign intelligence collected or produced by the U.S. agencies is of value in planning or executing psychological operations. Most of this information was being produced for military or political purposes long before there was general recognition of the importance of psychological warfare and propaganda. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to attempt to coordinate the production of all this intelligence merely on the basis of one of the several purposes which it serves--psychological operations. At the same time it is clear that for propaganda and psychological purposes more intelligence is needed than would otherwise be the case. The difference, however, is chiefly quantitative and not one of kind. An inspection of the twelve types of intelligence listed

in section B above shows that there is no clear dividing-line between the psychological and the political--even though such a line might possibly be drawn between the psychological and the military. Because of the impossibility of dividing political and psychological and because much of this intelligence is already being produced and is being coordinated on an ad hoc basis, it becomes necessary to treat the additional intelligence necessary for psychological support in the same way as that which is already being produced for political and other purposes. If present coordination is inadequate, the problem is a general one to be addressed all along the line and not by special arrangements in the "psychological" field.

2. In order to produce the best intelligence with a reasonable expenditure of money and trained personnel and with a minimum of jurisdictional friction between the agencies, there is one important concept that must be understood and accepted. This is the principle of interdependence, which involves a recognition of departmental specializations, a realization that every agency in the psychological field has intelligence needs in each of the twelve categories listed, and a willingness to cooperate in an attempt to fulfill the needs of other agencies besides one's own. (See NSCID 3.) This interdependence requires:
 - a. That each IAC agency perform its work with high competence and thus develop a confidence on the part of the other agencies. Conversely this implies that each agency in good faith provide full information to the others and make known any dissatisfaction with their products. Complaints should be taken as high as necessary to achieve results.
 - b. That each agency make extraordinary efforts to give prompt attention to the requests of others and not to give precedence automatically to internal requests over those received from other agencies. These decisions on priorities can be made only by the responsible head of the producing unit, and he can make wise decisions only if fully informed by the several requesting offices.
 - c. That the intelligence people have or get the authority necessary from their own chiefs to enable them to deal directly and informally with their opposite numbers in the other agencies.
3. In order to produce the kind of intelligence support needed, a close relationship should be established between the psychological planners and operators and their intelligence counterparts. Although the Air Force's psychological division must look primarily to AFOIN for support, this should not be construed

to prevent direct contacts by the psychological division under AFOIN sponsorship, with State intelligence. It is important that all PW planners and operators understand the fields of the various intelligence units and to some extent are familiar with their current production plans. Only in this way can satisfactory support be provided.

4. Initiative in the field of psychological intelligence can and should come from several different places: any one of the IAC intelligence agencies, any of the operators or planners, Mr. Barrett's PCB and its secretariat, and the new PSB with its director and staff. The first thing to do with an idea or request in this field is to get it to an intelligence agency. The departmental operators and planners would naturally go to the intelligence agencies in their own departments. Ideas from PCB can reach Intelligence through any one of a number of channels, the most usual of which would be from Mr. Barrett and P to Mr. Armstrong and R. (The channels for PSB will be discussed below.) It then becomes the responsibility of whatever intelligence agency has been approached to get the information requested. The principal burden may fall on it or may be passed to another agency with more direct interest in the subject matter. In either case the person ultimately to do the job proceeds to get it done and coordinates with others as needed, calling and chairing ad hoc meetings if necessary. Thus, neither does State do all the coordinating nor is it relieved of doing any.
5. CIA has several distinct responsibilities in the field of psychological intelligence. O/PC's interest as a consumer need not be discussed. O/O contributes both raw and evaluated intelligence largely from its [redacted] [redacted] The other collection offices operate as for other types of intelligence and the same is true of the handling and dissemination of the raw and finished product. O/SI is responsible for the scientific and technical intelligence on communications and jamming. O/NE will coordinate the production of national estimates in the psychological field as they do in any other. The Office of Intelligence Coordination has a responsibility to see that appropriate intelligence support is provided for psychological operations and that the intelligence activities of the government in this field are properly coordinated.
6. CIA's coordinating responsibility, which falls on O/IC, does not involve a substantive review of the papers produced elsewhere; nor is it a channel for transmitting the requests or output of one agency to another. It does provide a neutral place to which problems and complaints can be brought if the usual direct approach has been found inadequate. This means that O/IC is concerned with difficulties and arrangements and should not be looked to for help in coordinating a substantive

paper where the experts involved can accomplish it themselves. O/IC will take such initiative as it can to improve the coordination of intelligence support for psychological operations, but it will be forced to rely to a considerable degree on the other agencies to point out defects or, if possible, to effect improvements without reference to O/IC.

7. To whom does the director of the new Psychological Strategy Board look for his intelligence support? In pursuance of the analysis and principles developed in this paper, he should look directly to the producing agency. Although this paper has been focused on the information and propaganda aspects of psychological operations, the principles are equally applicable to the other fields of the Board's activity. If it is clear which intelligence agency is responsible for the desired information, this direct approach is simpler and more effective. If the PSB staff does not know where to get the information they seek, they should raise the matter with CIA (Office of Intelligence Coordination), which will either direct them to the proper agency or arrange for the responsibility to be clearly placed. If the quality of the reports received is inferior, the PSB staff, like any other requestor, should discuss the matter with the producing agency. If unable to achieve results this way, however, they should bring their problem to the attention of CIA (Office of Intelligence Coordination) and request assistance.